MTU Cork Library Catalogue

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Rewarding results : motivating profit center managers / Kenneth A. Merchant.

By: Merchant, Kenneth A.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Harvard Business School series in accounting and control.Publisher: Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business School Press, c1989Description: xvi, 272 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.ISBN: 0875842151; 0071032584.Subject(s): Executives -- Salaries, etc | Employee motivation | ProfitDDC classification: 658.407
Contents:
Introduction -- Using contracts to motivate profit center managers -- Trade-offs in motivational contracts -- Using short-term accounting earnings to exert consistent short-term performance pressure -- Correcting for the short-term bias in accounting measures of performance -- The controllability problem, Part I: Deciding whether to exclude uncontrollable elements from earnings-based performance measures -- The controllability problem, Part II: Deciding whether to adjust for uncontrollable influences after the fact -- Using motivational contract elements for nonmotivational purposes -- Evaluating contract effectiveness, Part I: The incidence of myopia and earnings management -- Evaluating contract effectiveness, Part II: Foregone motivation and excessive compensation -- Designing and managing good motivational contracts.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
General Lending MTU Bishopstown Library Lending 658.407 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available 00013606
General Lending MTU Bishopstown Library Lending 658.407 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available 00013607
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

On the strengths and weaknesses of the typical rewards contract now in use. An analysis of how well it works to tie manager's bonuses and promotions to performance. Annotation(c) 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-260) and index.

Introduction -- Using contracts to motivate profit center managers -- Trade-offs in motivational contracts -- Using short-term accounting earnings to exert consistent short-term performance pressure -- Correcting for the short-term bias in accounting measures of performance -- The controllability problem, Part I: Deciding whether to exclude uncontrollable elements from earnings-based performance measures -- The controllability problem, Part II: Deciding whether to adjust for uncontrollable influences after the fact -- Using motivational contract elements for nonmotivational purposes -- Evaluating contract effectiveness, Part I: The incidence of myopia and earnings management -- Evaluating contract effectiveness, Part II: Foregone motivation and excessive compensation -- Designing and managing good motivational contracts.

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