Includes bibliographical references (pages 218-235) and index.

One: My map of the field -- Overall trend: from historicism to naturalism -- The great pretender: the sociology of scientific knowledge -- The old chesnuts: rationalism and realism -- The growth areas: biology and cognitive science -- An itinerary for the nineties: does science compute? -- The new wave: metascience -- Feminism: the final frontier? -- Two: Mythical naturalism and anemic normativism: a look at the status quo -- The mythical status of the internal history of science, or why the philosophy of science is suffering an identity crisis -- Dismantling this myth, step by step -- Gently easing ourselves out of internalism: the case of disciplines -- If internalism is such a myth, then why don't the sociologists have the upper hand? -- Still the internalists do not have a lock on the concept of rationality -- Nor on the concept of reality, where things are a complete mess -- The end of realism, or deconstructing everything in and out of sight -- But what's left of scientific rationality? only your management scientist knows for sure -- Finale: some new things for philosophers to worry about -- Three: Reposing the naturalistic question: What is knowledge? -- Naturalism as a threat to rartionality; the case of Laudan -- Shards of a potted history of naturalism -- Why today's naturalistic philosophy of science is modeled more on Aristotle than on Darwin -- Why a truly naturalistic science of science might just do away with science -- A parting shot at misguided naturalism: piecemeal approaches to scientific change -- Towards a new dismal science of science: a first look at the experimental study of scientific reasoning -- Sociologists versus psychologists, and a revolution versus social epistemology -- If people are irrational, then maybe knowledge needs to be beefed up -- Or maybe broken down -- Or maybe we need to resort to metaphors; everyone else has -- Could reason be modeled on a society modeled on a computer? -- Could computers be the very stuff of which reason is made? -- Yes, but there's still plenty of room for people! -- Four: Reposing the normative question: What ought knowledge be? -- Knowledge policy requires that you find out where the reason is in knowledge production -- Unfortunately on this issue, philosophers and sociologists are most wrong where they most agree -- However, admitting the full extent of this error suggests a radical reworking of the history of science -- But it also means that the epistemic legitimacy of the interpretive method has been undermined -- Moreover, the fall of the interpretive method threatens the new cognitive history of science -- Still, none of this need endanger the rationality of science, if we look in other directions -- Reconstructing rationality 1: getting history into gear -- Reconstructing rationality II: experiment against the infidels -- The perils and possibilities of modeling norms: some lessons from the history of economics -- The big problem: how to take the first step toward improving science? -- Behaviorally speaking, the options are numerous but disparate -- If the display of norms is so disparate, then the search for cognitive coherence is just so much voodoo.