Applied industrial economics / edited by Louis Phlips.
Contributor(s): Phlips, Louis
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1998Description: ix, 443 p. ; 26 cm. + hbk.ISBN: 0521620546 ; 0521629543 .Subject(s): Industrial organization (Economic theory)DDC classification: 338.5 | Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Lending | MTU Bishopstown Library Lending | 338.5 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 00074584 |
Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:
This reader provides a unique mix of American and European contributions to the study of particular markets, often combined with a critical evaluation of antitrust regulations, decisions or judgments. Part I explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part II illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts III and IV give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material. Particular highlights include the discussion and evaluation of antitrust regulations, which involve a systematic comparative analysis of European and American regulations, decisions and judgments in this area.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction -- I: Market structure -- II: Industrial pricing and pricing schemes -- III: Competition policy -- IV: Mergers and merger control.
Table of contents provided by Syndetics
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I Market Structure
- 1 Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview
- 2 Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article
- 3 Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry
- 4 Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries
- 5 Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - a shakeouta or astakeouta
- Part II Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes
- 6 Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly
- 7 Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy
- 8 Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies
- 9 Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producersa competition
- 10 Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market
- 11 Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion
- 12 Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly
- Part III Competition Policy
- 13 Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation
- 14 Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy
- 15 Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD
- 16 Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers
- Part IV Mergers and Merger Control
- 17 Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium
- 18 Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis
- 19 Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment
- 20 Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply
- 21 Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgewortha's paradox of taxation
- 22 Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines
- 23 Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission
- Index