Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

Food has always been central to religious practice. From fasting at Ramadan to feasting at Diwali, from the laws of kashrut to the taking of communion, a great deal can be learned about a religion through an understanding of its link with food.

Six children from six religions tell their stories through words and photographs. The text is in the first person with each child speaking directly to the reader, making an engaging and visually appealing introduction to this important aspect of religion. The book covers six major religions: Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Buddhism and looks at celebrations, rules, fasting, and food and drink in rituals. Also included are authentic recipes for pancakes, honey cake, pakoras, coconut barfi and puris. All the children featured are from the respective religions and cultural background.

The book has been developed with the help of expert consultants from each religion.

Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Figures (p. vi)
• Tables (p. vii)
• Illustrations (p. ix)
• Acknowledgements (p. x)
• Note on the illustrations (p. xii)
• Introduction (p. xix)
• 1. The Myths of Militarism (p. 1)
• 2. Empires, Ententes and Edwardian Appeasement (p. 31)
• 3. Britain's War of Illusions (p. 56)
• 4. Arms and Men (p. 82)
• 5. Public Finance and National Security (p. 105)
• 6. The Last Days of Mankind: 28 June-4 August 1914 (p. 143)
• 7. The August Days: The Myth of War Enthusiasm (p. 174)
• 8. The Press Gang (p. 212)
• 9. Economic Capability: The Advantage Squandered (p. 248)
• 10. Strategy, Tactics and the Net Body Count (p. 282)
• 11. 'Maximum Slaughter at Minimum Expense': War Finance (p. 318)
• 12. The Death Instinct: Why Men Fought (p. 339)
• 13. The Captor's Dilemma (p. 367)
• 14. How (not) to Pay for the War (p. 395)
• Conclusion: Alternatives to Armageddon (p. 433)
• Notes (p. 463)
• Bibliography (p. 517)
• Index (p. 542)

Reviews provided by Syndetics

Library Journal Review

Ferguson (Jesus Coll., Oxford) challenges much of the dominant historiography of World War I by redirecting questions from the traditional approach, such as whether the Schlieffen plan could have worked, to more complex issues, such as why German military superiority failed to achieve victory on the Western Front. His analysis and his multinational approach make for gripping reading; he is not afraid to challenge the conventional wisdom about the war, considering, for instance, whether Britain might have acted to avoid a worldwide conflict. His analysis of war literature and propaganda raises important issues regarding why men continue to fight despite having to endure horrifying conditions. While scholars focusing on a single nation might disagree with some of his specific conclusions, Ferguson has made an important contribution to our understanding of the long-term impact of the Great War. His book will also spark serious discussion about the nature of war in the modern world. Recommended for all libraries.ÄFrederic Krome, Jacob Rader Marcus Ctr. of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Publishers Weekly Review

Many readers will disagree with Oxford historian Ferguson's (Paper and Iron) daring revisionist account of the Great War as presented in this superbly illustrated book, but none will be bored by his elegant marshaling of facts to support his case. Ferguson argues that Germany had a justifiable fear of Russian and French militarism and was merely making a preemptive strike in August 1914. He suggests that Britain forced the escalation of what could have been a limited continental war by entering on the side of the Allies and then increased the body count on both sides through sheer ineptitude. An economic historian, Ferguson explains that Germany was efficient at inflicting "maximum slaughter at minimum expense," paying just $5133 to kill each Allied serviceman. The bungling but economically advantaged Allies, on the other hand, paid $16,754 for each German head. For all the book's strengths, however, Ferguson comes up short in his flawed, briefly sketched analyses of the ebb and flow of diplomatic and battlefield events. Grand strategy goes unstudied. Ferguson's war is, in the end, simply an economic problem. Scarcity equals loss, and whoever has the most supplies will prevail. Ultimately, it is hard to feel satisfied with Ferguson's narrow analysis of what is surely a far more complex equation. (Apr.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

Every decade or so, historians have produced important works that challenge the understanding of one of the century's most important events, the Great War. Ferguson (Oxford) offers a major reassessment of many of this great conflict's crucial issues. He addresses eight of the war's more significant questions: Was it inevitable? Why did the Germans take such a gamble in 1914? Why did Britain intervene? Was there really an outbreak of popular enthusiasm for the war? How did the powers' military and economic efficiency influence the war's outcome? Why did the men keep fighting? Why did the war end? Who won the peace? He then provides answers that are provocative and important. Ferguson's dissection of British foreign minister Sir Edward Grey and his comparative analysis of the German and Allied war economies will produce real debate in the historical community. His assertion of Germany's ability to pay the postwar indemnity levied by the Allies is a welcome rejoinder to the old mantra of a "Carthaginian peace." Suitable for every level of interest, The Pity of War is indispensable for all modern European history collections. G. P. Cox; Gordon College

Kirkus Book Review

As the 20th century draws to a close, Ferguson (Modem History/Oxford Univ.; The House of Rothschild, 1998) renders a brilliant reassessment of one of the century's most far-reaching and tragic wars, the First World War. Ferguson unpacks the terror and tragedy of the war while demolishing widely held beliefs about it. One of these was that the war was an inevitable result of regnant imperialism and militarism: Ferguson argues trenchantly that the trend in Europe in 1914 was away from militarism and that German feelings of growing military weakness started the war. Ferguson also contends that equivocal British policies in Europe and failure to maintain a credible army to back up its continental commitments, among other factors, led Britain needlessly to transform a continental conflict into a world war. Ferguson also establishes that until the collapse of the German leadership's morale in late 1918, Germany was actually winning the war by any important measure'though vastly economically inferior to Britain, Germany had defeated three of the Entente powers and came close to defeating France, Britain, and Italy. Moreover, Ferguson contends, because of the tactical excellence of its armies, Germany was far more efficient then the Entente powers at inflicting casualties on its enemies until the very end of its failed 1918 offensive. The author also attacks the common view that the masses greeted the war enthusiastically in 1914. He scrutinizes in depth the propaganda war, the often draconian suppression of dissent in the belligerent countries, the soldiers' diverse and often banal motives for fighting, and shifting combatant attitudes toward surrender, which, he asserts, was a risky act, since both sides routinely killed surrendering men. Changing attitudes toward surrender may have contributed to the final collapse of German form. In the end, Ferguson concludes, WWI was not unavoidable, but ``the greatest error of modern history.'' Moving, penetrating, eye-opening, and lucidly reasoned. An important work of historical analysis. (16 pages b&w photos) (Author tour; radio satellite tour)

Author notes provided by Syndetics

Niall Ferguson was born April 18, 1964, in Glasgow. He is a Scottish historian. He specializes in financial and economic history as well as the history of empire. He is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and the William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School.

His books include Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation 1897-1927 (1993), Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (1997), The Pity of War: Explaining World War One (1998), The World's Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (1998), The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (2001), Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (2003), Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (2004), The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (2006) and The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (2008), Civilization: The West and the Rest (2011) , The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die, and The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook.

(Bowker Author Biography)