Table of contents provided by Syndetics

• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 On the Grounds of Aesthetic Value
• 2 Aesthetic Satisfaction
• 3 Goodness in Literature
• Illustration and Demonstration of What is of Central Importance for Human Life
• Originality in Use of Language, and in Treatment of Plot, Character, etc
• Representation of People, Things and Circumstances
• Overall Unity in Variety of Substance and Effect
• Seriousness of Theme
• Original Treatment of the Medium of Words and Ideas
• The Bringing Out of How Things Are or Might Be
• Overall Unity of Substance and Effect
• 4 Goodness in Visual Art
• Enhancement of Our Perception and Imagination
• Emotional Significance
• Unity in Variety of Substance and Effect
• 5 Goodness in Music
• Exploitation of the Medium As Such
• Clarity and Intensity of Depiction of Emotion and Mood, and Importance of the Emotions or Moods in the Business of Human Living
• Unity in Diversity
• Conclusion
• Notes and References
• Index

Reviews provided by Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Since 1910, when G.E. Moore issued his definition of the ``naturalistic fallacy,'' theorists have regarded the uncertainties of evaluative statements as proof that a basis for the evaluation of art does not exist. Consequently, critics have shied away from the use of the word ``good'' in describing art or artworks. Among those who have sought to circumvent the solemn pronouncement are Arthur Danto and George Dickie; working separately on an ``institutional theory of art'' Dickie made use of an inductive procedure (e.g., essays in Culture and Art, ed. by L. Aagaard-Mogensen, 1976). Meynell (religious studies, University of Calgary) describes his work as ``complementary'' to Danto and Dickie, and contends that the ``actual judgments of reputable critics'' can serve as the ``data against which is tested the theory about the nature of aesthetic judgments.'' Meynell distinguishes two categories of properties in artworks, those that are ``constitutive of values'' and those that are merely ``conducive of values''; is this the old distinction between fine and useful arts? The former constitute the ``goodness'' that yields aesthetic pleasure to properly sensitive persons under proper conditions. The discussion is made more interesting through the inclusion of allusions to specific works of art. Recommended for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy and the arts.-D. Kolker, Cleveland State University